Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
From MaRDI portal
Abstract: I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to the applicant but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned using an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism, too few acquire information, generating a significant welfare loss. Affirmative action and other realistic policies may lead to a Pareto improvement. As incentives to acquire information differ across mechanisms, ignoring such incentives may lead to incorrect welfare assessments, for example, in comparing a popular Immediate Assignment and an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism.
Recommendations
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
- Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
- Preferences of agents in decentralized task allocation
- Mechanism design with information acquisition
- Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching
- Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
- Positional information and preference aggregation
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Cites work
- Auctions, market mechanisms and their applications. First international ICST conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8--9, 2009. Revised Selected Papers
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5178094 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 894528 (Why is no real title available?)
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Self-selection in school choice
- Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Stable matching with incomplete information
- Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
- Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
- The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
Cited in
(5)- Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- School choice with costly information acquisition
This page was built for publication: Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2067372)
