Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.15MaRDI QIDQ5236196zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli

Publication date 15 October 2019

Published in Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.15

zbMATH Keywords

agents with heterogeneous preferencesassignment problemdistributional constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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Cited in

(9)

• Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line
• Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
• Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
• The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
• Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship
• Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
• Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
• On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
• A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain

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