The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2675446
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.002zbMath1498.91276arXiv2008.08991OpenAlexW3125375426WikidataQ114395269 ScholiaQ114395269MaRDI QIDQ2675446
Publication date: 23 September 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.08991
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (2)
Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions ⋮ Simultaneous eating algorithm and greedy algorithm in assignment problems
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Random assignments of bundles
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Constrained random matching
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Pareto optimality in coalition formation
- The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
- School Choice with Consent*
- Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints
- Assignment Mechanisms under Distributional Constraints
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
This page was built for publication: The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
