Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
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Publication:896952
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.008zbMATH Open1330.91107OpenAlexW2113396860MaRDI QIDQ896952FDOQ896952
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.008
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Cites Work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (22)
- On slots' scheduling
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- Corrigendum to: ``Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
- Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Constrained random matching
- Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
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