Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
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Publication:896952
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.008zbMath1330.91107OpenAlexW2113396860MaRDI QIDQ896952
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.008
Related Items (17)
Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems ⋮ Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets ⋮ Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms ⋮ Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure ⋮ Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
Cites Work
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- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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