Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
- Allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
Cited in
(8)- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
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