Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
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Publication:402069
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.11.002zbMATH Open1296.91174OpenAlexW2007097209MaRDI QIDQ402069FDOQ402069
Publication date: 27 August 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1333.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- School Choice with Consent*
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
- Decomposing random mechanisms
Cited In (31)
- Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- An optimal assignment problem with choice strategy
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Efficient lottery design
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- Corrigendum to: ``Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
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