Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
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Publication:6665686
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Gale-Shapley stable marriage problem revisited: strategic issues and applications
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- School Choice with Consent*
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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