A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
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Publication:766250
DOI10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8zbMath1233.91203OpenAlexW2010157650MaRDI QIDQ766250
Publication date: 23 March 2012
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8
Related Items
Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
Cites Work
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage