Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00257-4zbMath1489.91179OpenAlexW3184667305MaRDI QIDQ2128949

Yusuke Iwase

Publication date: 22 April 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00257-4

zbMATH Keywords

matching with contractsdoctor-optimal stable mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
• A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

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