The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Publication:3686381
DOI10.2307/1912658zbMath0569.90008OpenAlexW2061816303MaRDI QIDQ3686381
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912658
latticecoremanipulabilitymatching marketsassignment gamestwo-sided marketsgeneral demand structureset of equilibrium prices
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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