The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets (Q3686381)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3910082
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    The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3910082

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      The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets (English)
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      1985
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      assignment games
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      core
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      manipulability
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      two-sided markets
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      general demand structure
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      matching markets
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      set of equilibrium prices
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      lattice
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      This paper considers two-sided markets with general demand structure. A market is two-sided if no buyer wants more than one unit, sellers may offer multiple units, and the good is indivisible. A market is matching if an assignment of buyers and sellers results, in which a monetary payment over the unit involved is possible. The market for new homes, the market for professorships, and the market for admission to college are examples of two-sided matching markets. The paper contains two major results. First, the set of equilibrium prices forms a lattice; in particular, it has a maximal and a minimal element. Second, the minimal price equilibrium is nonmanipulable by buyers in the following sense. In the game in which buyers reveal demand strategically and sellers reveal supply honestly, the minimal price equilibrium is a strong equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is manipulable by sellers. If sellers reveal supply strategically, then the maximal price equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
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