The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
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Publication:6059531
DOI10.3982/te4405arXiv1808.07924OpenAlexW3123987044MaRDI QIDQ6059531
Publication date: 2 November 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07924
latticecompetitive equilibriumfrictionsindivisible goodsfull substitutabilitytrading networksimperfectly transferable utilityrural hospitals
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Cites Work
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