Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
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Publication:1651280
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.010zbMath1400.91376OpenAlexW2752501303MaRDI QIDQ1651280
Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Ross Rheingans-Yoo
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.010
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