Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105346zbMath1471.91238OpenAlexW3194817331MaRDI QIDQ2231426

Koji Yokote

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105346

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesscomparative staticscompetitive equilibriajob matchingdiscrete convex analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

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