Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
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Publication:1651278
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015zbMath1400.91375OpenAlexW2795874897MaRDI QIDQ1651278
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.015
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