A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1597936
DOI10.1007/s001990100179zbMath1050.91073OpenAlexW2126206231MaRDI QIDQ1597936
Publication date: 4 June 2002
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100179
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