A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (Q1597936)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748972
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    A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748972

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      A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (English)
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      4 June 2002
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      It is proved that the set of stable matchings in a two-sided matching market is a distributive lattice under the common preferences of all agents on any one side of the market. The main conditions assumed are the path-independence and a new property called ``cardinal-monotonicity''.
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      stable matchings
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      choice function
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      lattice
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