Agreement toward stability in matching markets

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0098-3zbMath1233.91200OpenAlexW2029490828MaRDI QIDQ766251

David Cantala

Publication date: 23 March 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0098-3

zbMATH Keywords

latticematchingdeferred acceptance algorithmunanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

The lattice of envy-free matchings

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
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• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

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