Restabilizing matching markets at senior level

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.005zbMath1079.91060OpenAlexW2051704205MaRDI QIDQ705941

David Cantala

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

Deferred acceptance algorithmSenior level marketsStable matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (11)

Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives ⋮ The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts ⋮ Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game ⋮ A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts ⋮ Markovian assignment rules ⋮ Welfare and stability in senior matching markets ⋮ The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples ⋮ Stable matchings and preferences of couples ⋮ Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets ⋮ Agreement toward stability in matching markets

Cites Work

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• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

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