Restabilizing matching markets at senior level

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.07.005zbMATH Open1079.91060OpenAlexW2051704205MaRDI QIDQ705941FDOQ705941

Authors: David Cantala 

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.005

Recommendations

• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
• Stable matching in large economies

zbMATH Keywords

Deferred acceptance algorithmSenior level marketsStable matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages

Cited In (11)

• The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
• Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
• Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game
• Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
• The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
• A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
• Markovian assignment rules
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets

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