Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game
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Publication:430896
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9288-xzbMath1242.91147OpenAlexW2010343395MaRDI QIDQ430896
Raïssa-Juvette Samba Zitou, Rhonya Adli
Publication date: 26 June 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9288-x
Applications of game theory (91A80) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Assignment games with stable core
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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