Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
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Publication:2482669
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Cites work
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
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