Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
Senior matching markets are considered, where workers are assigned to firms at an unstable matching -- the status-quo -- which might not be Pareto efficient. It might also be that none of the matchings Pareto superior to the status-quo are Core stable. Two weakenings of Core stability are proposed: status-quo stability and weakened stability, and the respective mechanisms which lead any status-quo to matchings meeting the above-mentioned stability requirements. The first one is inspired by the Top trading cycle and Deferred Acceptance procedures, the other one belongs to the family of Branch and Bound algorithms. The last procedure finds a core stable matching in many-to-one markets whenever it exists, dispensing with the assumption of substitutability.
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Robust stability in matching markets
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
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