Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2482669
DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0079-0zbMATH Open1146.91031OpenAlexW1988652551MaRDI QIDQ2482669FDOQ2482669
Authors: David Cantala, F. Sánchez-Sánchez 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0079-0
Recommendations
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Robust stability in matching markets
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
Cites Work
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- A further note on the stable matching problem
Cited In (6)
This page was built for publication: Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2482669)
