Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
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Publication:2931695
DOI10.1287/opre.2014.1276zbMath1303.91122OpenAlexW2069732785MaRDI QIDQ2931695
Mark Braverman, Itai Ashlagi, Avinatan Hassidim
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/09d81d222a2c7cd00e654cac3f5d0c0873212416
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