Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1668513
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.016zbMath1396.91577OpenAlexW2469170405MaRDI QIDQ1668513
Publication date: 29 August 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.016
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Cites Work
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