Rationalizable choice functions
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Publication:2206803
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.07.003zbMATH Open1452.91225OpenAlexW3043499375MaRDI QIDQ2206803FDOQ2206803
Authors: Yi-You Yang 
Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.003
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Cites Work
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Cited In (15)
- Rationalizability of Plott consistent choice functions: a corrigendum
- Rationalizable variable-population choice functions
- Learnability and rationality of choice.
- On justifiable choice functions over opportunity sets
- Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
- Rational stability of choice functions
- Matroidal choice functions
- List-rationalizable choice
- Rationalizations of choice functions
- Minimal rationalizations
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Every Choice Function Is Pro-Con Rationalizable
- Rational decision principle and social choice function
- Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Reasoning about social choice functions
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