Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
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Publication:523462
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.002zbMATH Open1409.91184OpenAlexW2254016172MaRDI QIDQ523462FDOQ523462
Authors: Sangram Vilasrao Kadam 
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://scholar.harvard.edu/kadam/node/139666
Recommendations
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
- Preserving Contract Satisfiability Under Non-monotonic Composition
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Testing substitutability
- On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
Cited In (10)
- On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
- Rationalizable choice functions
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
- Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
- Stability vs. no justified envy
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
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