Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.002MaRDI QIDQ523462zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sangram Vilasrao Kadam

Publication date 21 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://scholar.harvard.edu/kadam/node/139666

zbMATH Keywords

matching with contractsmany-to-one matchingsubstitutable completabilityunilateral substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
• Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
• On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Preserving Contract Satisfiability Under Non-monotonic Composition
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
• Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
• Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
• On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Testing substitutability
• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts

Cited in

(10)

• On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
• Rationalizable choice functions
• Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
• A college admissions clearinghouse
• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
• Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
• Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
• Stability vs. no justified envy
• An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches

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