Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.01.040MaRDI QIDQ2452968zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francis X. Flanagan

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.040

zbMATH Keywords

consistent substitutesmatchingstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Conditional stable matchings
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
• Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts

Cites work

• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts

Cited in

(9)

• Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
• On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
• Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
• The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations
• On relationships between substitutes conditions
• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
• Conditional stable matchings

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