Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2013375
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.006zbMath1393.91115OpenAlexW3123445940MaRDI QIDQ2013375
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.006
population monotonicitymatching with contractsresource monotonicitycumulative offer processrespecting improvementsextension monotonicity
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (5)
A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks ⋮ Corrigendum to: ``Some further properties of the cumulative offer process ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Some further properties of the cumulative offer process