Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
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Publication:2049498
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.002zbMath1470.91189OpenAlexW3186931388MaRDI QIDQ2049498
Toshiyuki Hirai, Jun Zhang, Keisuke Bando
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.002
stabilitymany-to-many matchingobservable substitutabilitycumulative offer algorithmsize monotonicity
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