Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

DOI10.3982/ECTA11419zbMath1312.91050OpenAlexW1926294820MaRDI QIDQ5397569

Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11419

zbMATH Keywords

backwards inductionrationalizable choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Identification of payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games ⋮ Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games ⋮ Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set ⋮ Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games ⋮ Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable ⋮ Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice ⋮ Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

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