Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable

DOI10.3982/ECTA11419MaRDI QIDQ5397569zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont

Publication date 24 February 2014

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11419

zbMATH Keywords

backwards inductionrationalizable choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited in

(9)

• Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
• Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games
• Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Identification of payoffs in repeated games
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
• Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models

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