Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.003MaRDI QIDQ2013370zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2197

zbMATH Keywords

random choicerationalizabilityrevealed preferencestochastic preferencebackwards-induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3156726 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3761717 (Why is no real title available?)
• Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees

Cited in

(4)

• Frame-based stochastic choice rule
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set

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