Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.003zbMATH Open1393.91042OpenAlexW2540676725MaRDI QIDQ2013370FDOQ2013370

Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2197

zbMATH Keywords

random choicerationalizabilityrevealed preferencestochastic preferencebackwards-induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
• Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

Cited In (2)

• Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
• Frame-based stochastic choice rule

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