Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6154274
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111554OpenAlexW4391089591MaRDI QIDQ6154274
Publication date: 19 March 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111554
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
- Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice
- Game theory via revealed preferences
- Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
- On the testable implications of collective choice theories
- Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees
- On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
- Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable
This page was built for publication: Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set