Implications of Pareto efficiency for two-agent (household) choice

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.01.001zbMATH Open1233.91079OpenAlexW2063719205MaRDI QIDQ553519FDOQ553519

Authors: Federico Echenique, Lozan Ivanov 

Publication date: 27 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/20353/

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zbMATH Keywords

revealed preferencechoice theoryPareto efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Coloring of graphs and hypergraphs (05C15)

Cites Work

• Paretian quasi-orders: the regular two-agent case
• Partially Ordered Sets
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (11)

• Rational Household Labor Supply
• A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation
• Household Inefficiency and Equilibrium Efficiency
• Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
• The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior
• The testable implications of zero-sum games
• Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences
• Paretian partial orders: the two-agent case
• A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Revealed preference theory for finite choice sets

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