The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior
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Publication:483106
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0735-1zbMath1302.91060OpenAlexW2120744111MaRDI QIDQ483106
Publication date: 15 December 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/251999/3/005.pdf
Related Items (2)
A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation ⋮ Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms
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