The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
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Publication:2427841
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.05.001zbMath1235.91044OpenAlexW1997365851MaRDI QIDQ2427841
Publication date: 18 April 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/252242/3/016.pdf
computational complexitystatus-quo biasboundedly rational choice\(\mathbf {NP}\)-completenessrationalization by game treesrationalization by multiple rationalessequential rationalization
Related Items
Minimal rationalizations ⋮ Rationalization of indecisive choice behavior by pluralist ballots ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior ⋮ Sequential rationalization of multivalued choice ⋮ Complexity results for the weak axiom of revealed preference for collective consumption models
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