On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
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Publication:2426957
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0235-2zbMath1142.91024OpenAlexW2131891143MaRDI QIDQ2426957
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Aviv Zohar
Publication date: 14 May 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0235-2
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Cites Work
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- An Algorithmic Approach to Network Location Problems. II: Thep-Medians
- On the complexity of integer programming
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