Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation
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Publication:6120935
Abstract: In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragm'{e}n proposed a load-balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three committee voting rules resulting from this approach: two optimization variants - one minimizing the maximal load and one minimizing the variance of loads - and a sequential variant. We study Phragm'{e}n's methods from an axiomatic point of view, focusing on properties capturing proportional representation. We show that the sequential variant satisfies proportional justified representation, which is a rare property for committee monotonic methods. Moreover, we show that the optimization variants satisfy perfect representation. We also analyze the computational complexity of Phragm'{e}n's methods and provide mixed-integer programming based algorithms for computing them.
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