Approval-based apportionment
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Abstract: In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by casting approval ballots. This approval-based apportionment setting generalizes traditional apportionment and is a natural restriction of approval-based multiwinner elections, where approval ballots range over individual candidates instead of parties. Using techniques from both apportionment and multiwinner elections, we identify rules that generalize the D'Hondt apportionment method and that satisfy strong axioms which are generalizations of properties commonly studied in the apportionment literature. In fact, the rules we discuss provide representation guarantees that are currently out of reach in the general setting of multiwinner elections: First, we show that core-stable committees are guaranteed to exist and can be found in polynomial time. Second, we demonstrate that extended justified representation is compatible with committee monotonicity (also known as house monotonicity).
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Cites work
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Cited in
(10)- Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation
- The maximin support method: an extension of the d'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections
- Approval-based voting with mixed goods
- An issue of guaranteed representation in a variant of Hamilton's method
- Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes
- Dynamic proportional rankings
- Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences
- Individual representation in approval-based committee voting
- Proportional justified representation
- Generative social choice
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