Approval-based voting with mixed goods
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Recommendations
Cites work
- Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
- Cake cutting algorithms
- Fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3863589 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234106 (Why is no real title available?)
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
- On Approximate Envy-Freeness for Indivisible Chores and Mixed Resources
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