Cake cutting algorithms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5133016
Recommendations
Cited in
(43)- Expand the shares together: envy-free mechanisms with a small number of cuts
- Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles
- Mind the gap: cake cutting with separation
- Two's company, three's a crowd: consensus-halving for a constant number of agents
- Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
- Envy-free allocations respecting social networks
- Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
- Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
- Fair division of mixed divisible and indivisible goods
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods with minimum inequality or minimum envy
- How to share a cake with a secret agent
- Cake cutting: explicit examples for impossibility results
- Existence of a simple and equitable fair division: a short proof
- On the complexity of cake cutting
- Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX
- Fair multi-cake cutting
- Fair cake-cutting in practice
- Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents
- On fairness via picking sequences in allocation of indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5598643 (Why is no real title available?)
- Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234106 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on a Cake Cutting Algorithm of Banach and Knaster
- Fair distributions for more participants than allocations
- A survey of mass partitions
- Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles
- Contiguous cake cutting: hardness results and approximation algorithms
- Fair division of goods in the shadow of market values
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
- Approval-based voting with mixed goods
- Approximate envy-freeness in graphical cake cutting
- Fair profit division
- Dividing a graphical cake
- Settling the score: portioning with cardinal preferences
- Between proportionnality and envy-freeness: k-proportionality
- The incentive guarantees behind Nash welfare in divisible resources allocation
- Fair division with subjective divisibility
- Reforming an envy-free matching
- Truthful cake sharing
- Fair distribution of bundles
- Fairer than fair: sharp bounds for connected super-proportional cake cutting
- Approximating proportional and maximin allocations on d-claw-free graphs
- Truthful fair division without free disposal
This page was built for publication: Cake cutting algorithms
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5133016)
