Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01416-4zbMATH Open1505.91201arXiv1908.02988OpenAlexW3123265466MaRDI QIDQ2103594FDOQ2103594

Authors: Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi 

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n=2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n > 2 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril, called non-obvious manipulability, is compatible with the strong fairness property of proportionality, which guarantees that each agent receives 1/n of the cake. Both properties are satisfied by the leftmost leaves mechanism, an adaptation of the Dubins - Spanier moving knife procedure. Most other classical proportional mechanisms in literature are obviously manipulable, including the original moving knife mechanism. Non-obvious manipulability explains why leftmost leaves is manipulated less often in practice than other proportional mechanisms.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.02988

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited In (3)

• (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents

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