Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01416-4zbMath1505.91201arXiv1908.02988OpenAlexW3123265466MaRDI QIDQ2103594

Erel Segal-Halevi, Josué Ortega

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.02988

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
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• Fair and square: cake-cutting in two dimensions
• Proportional pie-cutting
• Fair cake-cutting in practice
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations
• Truthful Fair Division
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• How to Cut A Cake Fairly
• Cake Cutting Algorithms

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