(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103015zbMATH Open1546.91181MaRDI QIDQ6596162FDOQ6596162

Authors: Peter Troyan 

Publication date: 2 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• Obvious manipulations
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment

zbMATH Keywords

matchingschool choiceobvious manipulationsrank-minimizing mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• Random assignment problems
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Essentially stable matchings
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• Random Assignment with Integer Costs
• Strategy-proofness in the large
• Obvious manipulations
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets

This page was built for publication: (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6596162)