(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
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Publication:6596162
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Essentially stable matchings
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules
- Obvious manipulations
- Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Assignment with Integer Costs
- Random assignment problems
- Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
- School Choice with Consent*
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
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