(Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103015MaRDI QIDQ6596162zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Peter Troyan

Publication date 2 September 2024

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matchingschool choiceobvious manipulationsrank-minimizing mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
• Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
• Obvious manipulations
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Essentially stable matchings
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• Obvious manipulations
• Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
• On cores and indivisibility
• Random Assignment with Integer Costs
• Random assignment problems
• Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Strategy-proofness in the large
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

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