Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1995295)
Abstract: We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for "how strategyproof" an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.
Recommendations
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences
Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Automated mechanism design: a new application area for search algorithms
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
Cited in
(28)- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Smoothed and average-case approximation ratios of mechanisms: beyond the worst-case analysis
- The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Some further results on random OBIC rules
- Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
This page was built for publication: Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1995295)
