Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1995295
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105144zbMATH Open1458.91110arXiv1401.3675OpenAlexW3101852004MaRDI QIDQ1995295FDOQ1995295
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for "how strategyproof" an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3675
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming – CP 2003
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Strategy-proofness in the Large
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
Cited In (24)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Some further results on random OBIC rules
- Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
- Title not available (Why is that?)
This page was built for publication: Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1995295)
