Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105741zbMATH Open1530.91239OpenAlexW4386865414MaRDI QIDQ6090465FDOQ6090465

Authors: Ethem Akyol 

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105741

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zbMATH Keywords

random serial dictatorshipallocation without transfersBayesian incentive compatibilityrandom Boston mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Truncation strategies in matching markets
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism

Cited In (4)

• The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship
• A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
• Possible and necessary allocations under serial dictatorship with incomplete preference lists
• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information

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