Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105741MaRDI QIDQ6090465zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ethem Akyol

Publication date 17 November 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105741

zbMATH Keywords

random serial dictatorshipallocation without transfersBayesian incentive compatibilityrandom Boston mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Truncation strategies in matching markets
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions

Cited in

(3)

• A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
• Possible and necessary allocations under serial dictatorship with incomplete preference lists
• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information

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