Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
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Publication:665457
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.002zbMath1258.91088OpenAlexW1980278279MaRDI QIDQ665457
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.002
Related Items (12)
Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives ⋮ PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information ⋮ Selecting a winner with external referees ⋮ Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers ⋮ Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
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