Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
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Publication:665457
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.002zbMATH Open1258.91088OpenAlexW1980278279MaRDI QIDQ665457FDOQ665457
Authors: Antonio Miralles 
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.002
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Cited In (25)
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- Ordinal allocation
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Relative entropy and envy-free allocation
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
- Optimal allocation without transfer payments
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Selecting a winner with external referees
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