Optimal allocation without transfer payments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.006MaRDI QIDQ380892zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Surajeet Chakravarty, Todd R. Kaplan

Publication date 14 November 2013

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://people.exeter.ac.uk/RePEc/dpapers/DP1004.pdf, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001261?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

allocationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• A model of access in the absence of markets
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Optimal job assignment with spillover effects
• Pareto improvements in the contest for college admissions
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget

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