Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.08.008MaRDI QIDQ2437840zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniele Condorelli

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59676

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designnon-market mechanismsrationing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints
• Using and abusing economic theory
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals

Cited in

(13)

• Scarcity, competition, and value
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Rationality, property rights and thermodynamic approach to the market equilibrium
• Optimal investment in knowledge within a firm using a market mechanism
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• A model of access in the absence of markets
• Better lucky than rich? Welfare analysis of automobile licence allocations in Beijing and Shanghai
• Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents
• Redistribution through markets
• Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
• Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution
• Costly multidimensional screening
• Competition mechanisms for allocation of scarce resources

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