Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
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Publication:2437840
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008zbMath1283.91075MaRDI QIDQ2437840
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59676
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets, AUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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