Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008zbMath1283.91075MaRDI QIDQ2437840

Daniele Condorelli

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59676

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; rationing; non-market mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets, AUCTION–LOTTERY HYBRID MECHANISMS: STRUCTURAL MODEL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers

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