Redistribution through markets

DOI10.3982/ECTA16671MaRDI QIDQ5020499zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour

Publication date 6 January 2022

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16671

zbMATH Keywords

inequalitymechanism designredistributionwelfare theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(12)

• Redistribution of wealth when knowledge is dispersed
• Redistribution and compensation
• A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue
• Laissez-faire or full redistribution?
• Optimal market-integration decisions by policymakers: modeling and analysis of agriculture market data
• Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution
• Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
• Equitable rent division on a soft budget
• Screening while controlling an externality
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design
• Markups and inequality
• Optimal allocation via waitlists: simplicity through information design

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