Optimal allocation via waitlists: simplicity through information design

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAE013MaRDI QIDQ7008401zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Monachou, Afshin Nikzad

Publication date 21 March 2025

Published in The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDAE013

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

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• Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
• Redistribution through markets
• Some simple inequalities satisfied by convex functions.
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals

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