Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.005zbMath1408.90095OpenAlexW2192588584MaRDI QIDQ1785481

David Starobinski, Quanyan Zhu, Yezekael Hayel, Eran Simhon

Publication date: 28 September 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

queueing gamesrevenue optimizationpartial information system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items

On the optimal disclosure of queue length information ⋮ The effect of customer awareness on priority queues ⋮ The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy ⋮ Equilibrium queueing strategies in M/G/1 queues with the reference time effect ⋮ Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues ⋮ Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model ⋮ On the impact of information disclosure on advance reservations: a game-theoretic view ⋮ Strategic customer behavior in a queueing system with alternating information structure ⋮ Deterministic state-based information disclosure policies and social welfare maximization in strategic queueing systems ⋮ Optimal information policy in discrete-time queues with strategic customers ⋮ Analysis of strategic customer behavior in fuzzy queueing systems

Cites Work

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• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior
• Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study
• Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls

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