Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
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Publication:1785481
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2015.12.005zbMATH Open1408.90095OpenAlexW2192588584MaRDI QIDQ1785481FDOQ1785481
Authors: Eran Simhon, Y. Hayel, David Starobinski, Quanyan Zhu 
Publication date: 28 September 2018
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.005
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Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25)
Cites Work
- Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
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- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
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- Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes
- Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study
Cited In (13)
- Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
- Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model
- Analysis of strategic customer behavior in fuzzy queueing systems
- On the impact of information disclosure on advance reservations: a game-theoretic view
- Equilibrium and optimal strategies to join a queue with partial information on service times
- On the optimal disclosure of queue length information
- The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal information policy in discrete-time queues with strategic customers
- The effect of customer awareness on priority queues
- Deterministic state-based information disclosure policies and social welfare maximization in strategic queueing systems
- Equilibrium queueing strategies in M/G/1 queues with the reference time effect
- Strategic customer behavior in a queueing system with alternating information structure
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