Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1785481
Recommendations
- Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model
- Optimal information policy in discrete-time queues with strategic customers
- On the optimal disclosure of queue length information
- Optimal customer behavior in observable and unobservable discrete-time queues
- Deterministic state-based information disclosure policies and social welfare maximization in strategic queueing systems
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3174015 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3060775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study
- Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior
- Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes
- The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
- To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
Cited in
(13)- Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
- Deterministic state-based information disclosure policies and social welfare maximization in strategic queueing systems
- Equilibrium queueing strategies in M/G/1 queues with the reference time effect
- The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy
- Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model
- On the optimal disclosure of queue length information
- Equilibrium and optimal strategies to join a queue with partial information on service times
- Analysis of strategic customer behavior in fuzzy queueing systems
- Strategic customer behavior in a queueing system with alternating information structure
- The effect of customer awareness on priority queues
- Optimal information policy in discrete-time queues with strategic customers
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 530047 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the impact of information disclosure on advance reservations: a game-theoretic view
This page was built for publication: Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1785481)