Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model
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Publication:1728181
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2017.02.003zbMath1409.90061OpenAlexW2588298708MaRDI QIDQ1728181
Publication date: 22 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.02.003
Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22)
Related Items
On the optimal disclosure of queue length information ⋮ The effect of customer awareness on priority queues ⋮ The effect of loss preference on queueing with information disclosure policy ⋮ Equilibrium queueing strategies in M/G/1 queues with the reference time effect ⋮ Strategic customer behavior in a queueing system with alternating information structure ⋮ Deterministic state-based information disclosure policies and social welfare maximization in strategic queueing systems
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